Latest News on Flight 447 Air France
Air France Flight 447 crash inquiry could take more than year
Paul-Louis Arslanian, the director of the French agency investigating the crash of Air France Flight 447, said Monday that investigators could take at least a year-and-a-half to reach a conclusion.
Arslanian said he still doesn't know exactly where the plane went down nor what caused the accident, three months after the Rio to Paris flight crashed into the Atlantic, killing all 228 people aboard.
Speaking before a gathering of aviation journalists in Paris, Arslanian said the French BEA accident investigation agency has not issued a recommendation to airlines over speed measuring equipment (pitot tubes) because he didn't have evidence to justify it.
Nevertheless, since the crash both the European air safety agency and planemaker Airbus advised airlines to replace the Pitot probes used on the doomed jet with a later and more reliable model made by a US firm.
A series of automatic messages sent by the plane point to a malfunction of the Pitot tubes, which some experts think may have iced over and given false speed readings to the Air France plane's computers as it ran into a turbulent thunderstorm.
Just before Air France 447 went down, it transmitted a four-minute data reporting 5 failures and 19 warnings via its radios (ACARS). The data already gives a hint what went wrong on the airplane but the true story will come out if searchers find the black boxes.
Emergency messages emitted shortly before the crash showed that the pilot had had to revert to manual controls and that the plane’s speed was "inconsistent."
If true airspeed is not known it is so easy to stall or overspeed the plane. That’s why the A-330 has three pitot tubes. If they all iced up, or get clogged with crystals, they won’t work, but to prevent icing, they are heated. There were many instances that A-330 pitot tubes were icing and failing in flight so Airbus issued a “service bulletin” recommending airlines replace them with a newer model that has a more powerful heater. It was not considered urgent – and so the pitot tubes on the doomed plane had not been replaced yet.
After all these Mr. Arslanian still saying "If I had thought it was important to make a recommendation, I would have done it."
The epic thunderstorm system that Air France 447 flew into would have created icing that could have overwhelmed the factory installed original pitot tubes.
These type of failures chronicled in the ACARS text messages were identical to a 2008 event when an Air Caraibes A-330 flying the same route encountered same pitot tube icing. That plane was not in such severe circumstances so the crew was able to get things back under control – and lived to report it to their company and Airbus.
As auto flight control systems fail in an Airbus, the rules that the computers live by change from “normal”, to “alternate”, to “direct” law. At each stage the computers surrender more authority to the humans – until finally all computers gives up and control no more and all authority and controls are handed to pilots – with darkness and thunderstorm with no help at all from computers – at just the point they need them most.
Here in this event, while everything is calm and quiet aircraft getting blown around by turbulence, all major instruments become useless and hundreds of alarms some with very high pitch sounds and blinking lights all vie for pilots attention. And the need to fly with absolute minimum equipment and control.
A plane that was designed and built to be controlled by computers – with a deceptively simple cockpit becomes so complex and confusing it is almost impossible to pick the most urgent action.
In this event AF447 appeared to have crossed through three key thunderstorm clusters: a small one around, a new rapidly growing one at about, and finally a large multicell convective system (MCS). According to AF aircraft transmission, the aircraft entered a "thunderous zone with strong turbulence."
While three different flights deviated from the route and flew their destination safely begs the question: Why did the crew of AF447 decide to stick with the original route while they have the state-of-the-art radar showing the thunderstorms ahead?
The remains of Mr. Dubois, 58, and those of one of the stewards, were among a dozen bodies identified from 50 that were found in the Atlantic off Brazil and taken to the coastal city of Recife. The discovery of Mr. Dubois’ body was seen as a possible confirmation that, in keeping with standard practice, he was resting during the cruise phase of the flight. The first and second officers would have been at the controls. It is thought that seat-belted pilots were unlikely to have been thrown clear of the tightly enclosed flight deck.
Arslanian said around 1,000 parts of the plane have been recovered from the Atlantic Ocean - including a nearly intact vertical stabilizer-rudder, an engine cover, uninflated life jackets, seats and kitchen items.
Brazilian authorities have yet to send detailed information on the results of the autopsies, although the BEA is working with general information obtained from French authorities, he said.
Arslanian has said investigators are gearing up for a third phase of searching, over a wider area, which could cost tens of millions of euros and start before the end of the year. Airbus has offered to help fund the search.
A preliminary report into the crash said the plane hit the ocean intact and belly first at a high rate of speed. But without the flight recorders, investigators may never know fully what happened.
Relatives of the dead have angrily demanded that Air France and Airbus take responsibility for the crash and French prosecutors have opened a preliminary manslaughter investigation that could lead to negligence charges.
Hopes of finding the two flight recorders were almost finished because the locator beacons are already lost power by June 30.
Leaks from Air France and pilots’ unions indicated that the airline was aware earlier than it has publicly admitted that there was a problem with the speed instruments on the fleet of long-range A330 and A340 aircraft. At accident time Air France was already in the process of replacing the pitot tubes.
Air France 447 was the 36th flight in which there had been known faulty speed readings on the A330 and A340 series operated by various airlines, said Eurocockpit, a French-language website run by pilots, including Air France crew.
The previous incidents followed the same pattern as those reported by AF447, except that the pilots were able to recover control and return to normal flight.
Because of the storm conditions maintaining control in AF447 would have been a monumental task, the website said. “We have consulted the [Air France] pilots who had these pitot problems. All told us that it took a big immediate dose of lucidity to avoid distraction by the stall warnings which came with the incident and face up to the deluge of alarms.”
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Air France Flight 447 and 9/11 Typified Why The Black Box Data Should Be Telemetered To The Ground
For the last ten years there hasn’t been a technical reason why the digital flight recorder data isn't securely sent in real-time to the ground for storage (see the BBC/Equinox video “The BOX”, 4/2000, A look at the shortcomings found in black box flight recorders). During this ten year interval both the US and Europe have had the capability of implementing remote aircraft flight recording if only they had the will to do so. Using a remote aircraft flight recorder, within a couple of seconds, you have the planes position/location, its attitude, velocity, etc. safely stored on the ground and used for flight safety, aviation security and cost reduction. The data used in real-time could have also prevented 9/11 (see http://www.safelander.com).
On June 4, 2009 the Los Angeles Times put following information that I wrote into their LETTERS section: “There is no technical reason why digital flight recorder data are not sent in real-time to the ground. We have the technology to do this. Then, within a couple of seconds, we would have a plane’s position, altitude and velocity safely stored on the ground. This information could be used for flight safety, aviation security and cost reduction. We don’t know what went wrong on Air France Flight 447, but we would sure know where the plane went down, why it went down and possibly could have saved lives.” Getting to the crash site early may save lives, getting the DFDR can prevent recurring fatal crashes. It’s not just position that’s needed, it’s all of the data sent to the recorder that is critical to ascertaining the root cause of a crash and should be available to prevent some of the crashes from occurring.
The real-time use of the data recorders will save a substantial amount of lives, make our country safer and reduce the cost of flying. Telemetering the already digitized flight data to the ground in real-time would assure that we have the data. In some crashes the flight data isn't recovered (e.g. 9/11, et al) or has errors in it since no one is looking at it, or using it in real-time to find malfunctions. Yet, this valuable digital flight recorder data (DFDR) data has been essentially left to the autopsy mode for post mortem simulations and not utilized proactively in real-time to save lives on cargo and carrier aircraft. We got the astronauts back from the moon by ground personnel monitoring the data in real-time. It was the ground personnel that found the problem and relayed back to the capsule the safe solution that saved the astronauts lives. It is now time to utilize this proven methodology for the good of the public.
A year prior to 9/11 at the International Aviation Safety Association meeting in New York, methods for preventing crashes like golfer Payne Stewart’s decompression crash were proposed. None of these methods were implemented by the aviation industry and we got 9/11 (hijacking is about ten percent of aviation fatalities) and the 2005, 100 fatality, Helios decompression crash. When a plane deviates from its approved flight plan, we now have the ability to securely take remote control of it and land it safely at a designated airfield. We presently have remote pilot vehicles (RPVs) flying over Afghanistan that are controlled/piloted from continental United States (CONUS). Currently we are utilizing secure high bandwidth communication networks (for our RPVs, submarines, AWACS planes, etc.) and there isn't a logical reason for not making that technology available for cargo and carrier aircraft. The cost of 9/11 alone is ten times the cost of putting in a safe system and yet nothing has intentionally been done.
When a plane decompresses there is a good possibility that if we remotely bring it down in altitude to a point where there is sufficient oxygen and fly it remotely for 15 minutes, the pilot and passengers may regain consciousness. At that time the control of the aircraft could be returned to the pilot or remotely landing it to save the lives of the people who are onboard. This would have saved the lives of those aboard Helios.
Billions of dollars are wasted on unnecessary airport runway expansion and insufficient data programs to reduce fatal ground incursions. The lack of data has caused excessive verbal communication between the pilots and the controllers that is prone to errors. These ground incursions wouldn’t even occur if the flight data was shared so pilots and air traffic control had better visibility. But because the digital data isn’t shared automatically the pilot sees only a fraction of the information necessary to prevent a crash and the same holds true for the air traffic controllers (ATCs). Crashes such as Tenerife (583 fatalities), Comair (49 fatalities), etc. are directly caused by the lack of visibility due to not sharing the DFDR, ATC and airport runway data in real-time. Too many crashes are listed as pilot error when they are a direct result of a lack of visibility brought on by not sharing the digital flight data/Black Box in real-time to provide the necessary situation awareness. Many of the fatal in-air crashes fall into the same category. For example there was a crash where a plane ran out of fuel over JFK. The controller thought the pilot had more fuel left and the pilot who said his fuel was low didn’t use the correct emergency verbiage. Since the fuel supply is another black box input there is no reason why a red light, similar to the one on everyone’s car, doesn’t light up on the ATC display. The red low fuel light would reduce the controller’s work load and increase his situation awareness so that the people aboard a flight similar to the one that crashed would now live. Using the Black Box data decreases the work load of the pilot the air traffic controller as well as increases their situation awareness. By the lack of sharing the already digitized data in real-time we have egregiously curtailed the use of automation and expert systems technology for the prevention of crashes, increased the cost of flying and jeopardized our national security. The real-time use and sharing of the DFDR data to prevent crashes is more important then its present post mortem autopsy mode of operation.
The already digitized data used in real-time allows the use of automated expert systems to check many of an aircraft’s sensors prior to, and during, a flight to assure that everything is functioning correctly without having a person in the loop. When a malfunction is detected it can automatically inform the pilot and ATC as to the best way to work a round a malfunction. Using cross checks and correlation most of the sensors can be checked and work a round’s provided to the flight deck crew for safe transportation. It will also automatically notify the ground operational center of expected malfunctions and the safest work a round’s using a history file that should be followed. By so doing, the pilot’s work load will be reduced and his performance enhanced.
While pinpointing specific causes of a crash via the autopsy mode has merit it doesn’t address the broad generic systemic cause of most crashes namely not sharing the already digitized Black Box data in real-time for crash prevention. Piloting errors and mechanical failures will always occur but that is not a sufficient reason for the passengers to die. The fundamental reason for too many of the crashes is because the Black Box data has been denied from being utilized in real-time by the aviation industry out of fear for liability. We have operated commercial aviation in a dark age’s methodology. The aviation industry even fought against Black Boxes for many years. The Black Box technology came out of Australia. It was years and many fatal crashes later when it was embraced by the US and European aviation industry. Even when the US aviation industry embraced Black Box technology they severely limited the number of points that were allowed to be monitored. The net result we had recurring crashes such as the horrific USAIR, Flight 427, Aliquippa PA crash, in which my friend David Garber died, that was eventually solved by using British QAR (Quick Access Recorder) data. QARs weren’t utilized by US carrier aircraft. We must eliminate this liability fear of the airlines and pilots associations and enter into a new age of aviation enlightenment by utilizing the black box data in real-time to prevent crashes. The Black Box data should not be suppressed under the cover of industry private and parsed out begrudgingly. The Black Box data belongs to the public since it is necessary for their safety.
The Air France flight 447 crash is just the latest example of horrific crashes that possibly could have been prevented or saved lives. Using the Black Box data safely stored on the ground we surely would be able to minimize the anguish of the passenger’s families and recurring crashes. Ground storage eliminates the cost, time and risks associated with recorder recovery. The flight data used in real-time: reduces the cost of flying; prevents recurring fatal crashes; prevents a host of fatal crashes that aren’t directly related to Air France Flight 447, and keeps nations safe and secure. For the good of nation and its citizens, not only the flying public, we must utilize the Black Box data in real time.
Sy Levine
sylevine1@sbcglobal.net
(310) 559-2965
levines@wlac.edu
http://www.safelander.com
Remote Aircraft Flight Recorder and Advisory System (RAFT) patent #5,890,079, 3/30/1999
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